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The Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) in Japan collects funds
through government ﬁnancial institutions (most notably postal savings)
and uses the funds to ﬁnance public projects undertaken by government-
aﬃliated corporations or to ﬁnance government loans to borrowers in tar-
geted areas (targeted industries, small ﬁrms, mortgage borrowers, etc.).
Many countries have government-sponsored loan programs: The Japanese
program is distinguished by its size. At the end of ﬁscal 2000 (March 2001),
the FILP involved ¥418 trillion, equal to some 82 percent of gross domes-
tic product (GDP), and the program’s uses of funds statement totaled more
than the GDP. The postal savings system, the most important source of
funds for the FILP is the world’s largest ﬁnancial institution. It held ¥250
trillion in deposits (35 percent of total household deposits) at the end of ﬁs-
cal 2000.
The FILP may promote welfare and economic growth by ﬁnancing proj-
ects that have such large externalities that private institutions would not
undertake them. It also may be an impediment to welfare and growth by
allowing the government to pursue wasteful projects. Historically the pro-
gram has ignored market information, and its sheer size makes the cost
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Paying for the FILP
Takero Doi and Takeo Hoshiof resource misallocation enormous. This chapter examines the ﬁnancial
condition of the FILP and analyzes reforms begun in April 2001.
The goal of examining the FILP’s ﬁnancial condition is to see if it con-
stitutes a serious impediment to the recovery of the Japanese economy. The
FILP’s accounts are notoriously opaque. We scrutinize the balance sheets
of recipients of FILP funds, including special public corporations (SPCs),
central government accounts, and local governments. Through this exer-
cise, we can estimate the amount of ﬁnancial losses of the FILP either
buried in current balance sheets or expected to emerge in the near future.
The data show that existing losses and expected transfers to cover future
losses are enormous. These losses are implicit claims on the government
(and hence on taxpayers). Together with other implicit claims, such as the
cost of cleaning up the ﬁnancial sector (see chap. 1 of this volume), FILP
losses can seriously impede economic recovery.
Because the FILP is supposed to ﬁnance socially useful projects that
private institutions are unwilling to undertake, it is natural for there to be
losses. And, in fact, the central government has been transferring funds
from its accounts to numerous FILP agencies in the form of explicit subsi-
dies and capital contributions. The losses may be a result of insuﬃcient
past subsidies for social-welfare-increasing (but high-externality) projects.
However, any argument that stresses the welfare-enhancing aspects of the
FILP must be weighed against the substantial cost. That so little has been
done until recently—even by the government—to explore the cost and
beneﬁt of projects using FILP funds is telling.
Our second purpose is to describe the reform of the FILP introduced in
April 2001 and to evaluate its likely impact. The main stated goal of the re-
form is the introduction of market discipline in the allocation of funds.
Thus, we examine whether reform can be expected to reduce FILP losses
in the future.
The work presented here updates and expands that of a number of re-
searchers (primarily available only in Japanese), as outlined in the appendix.
The chapter is organized as follows. After brieﬂy describing how the FILP
is structured and its size, we begin our investigation of the ﬁnancial health
of FILP agencies. This involves performing a close examination of the bal-
ance sheets of the major FILP recipients, correcting for various accounting
problems. The ﬁnancial conditions of local governments, which are also im-
portant borrowers of the FILP, are then taken up. This is a topic not covered
extensively by other researchers. We then discuss the essence of the FILP re-
form introduced in April 2001, and evaluate the eﬀects that are observable
so far. We conclude by pointing out the direction for future research.
2.1 Background
The FILP is a government-sponsored program that ﬁnances govern-
ment ﬁnancial institutions and other government-related agencies. It is not
38 Takero Doi and Takeo Hoshijust a system of simple ﬁnancial intermediation because the government
and FILP agencies are also linked through ﬂows of direct grants and sub-
sidies. This section presents a brief overview of the structure, size, and his-
tory of the FILP.
2.1.1 Structure and Size
Figure 2.1 diagrams the structure of the FILP before the 2001 reform,
paying particular attention to the inter-relations between ﬁnancial inter-
mediation and ﬁscal transfers. The magnitude of the sums involved is given
in table 2.1, sources of funds, and table 2.2, uses of funds.
The Trust Fund Bureau (TFB) Fund is by far the most important source,
providing some 83 percent of funds as of the end of March 2001. The ma-
jority of the TFB Fund comes from postal savings. Its other major source
is pension reserves, which are the diﬀerence between the premium receipts
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Fig. 2.1 Structure of the FILP before April 2001
Note: IISA   Industrial Investment Special Account. PLIF   Postal Life Insurance Fund.
A box represents a sector or an institution involved in the FILP. The arrows indicate the di-
rection of the movement of funds, with solid lines indicating ﬁnancial transactions and bro-
ken lines being ﬁscal transfers. Numbers next to the lines refer to entries in tables 2.1 and 2.2,
which provide the yen amounts represented by the lines.Table 2.1 Sources of FILP Funds, March 2001 (¥ billions and %)
Line Amount Share Source
n.a. 439,663 83.1 TFB fund
4 61,658 11.6 Postal life insurance fund
5 3,383 0.6 Industrial investment SA
6 24,579 4.6 Government-guaranteed bonds
529,283 100.0 Total
Components of the TFB Funda
1 247,008 46.7 (56.2) Postal savings
2 142,593 26.9 (32.4) Pension reserves
n.a. 50,062 9.5 (11.4) Othersb
Source: Ministry of Finance (2002a).
Note: Line numbers refer to ﬁgure 2.1. SA = Special Account. n.a. = not applicable.
aNumbers in the parentheses show the shares within the TFB.
bIncludes postal life insurance premiums collected during the ﬁscal year (which are deposited
into the TFB) and short-term deposits by some special accounts, as well as proﬁts and re-
serves at the TFB.
Table 2.2 Uses of FILP Funds, March 2001 (¥ billions and %)
Line Amount Share Use
10 7,279 1.4 General account (JNR loans)a
11 57,350 10.8 Postal savings SAb
12 6,298 1.2 Other special accounts
13 259,617 49.0 FILP agenciesc
14 87,270 16.5 Local government
n.a. 417,814 78.9 FILP Plan total
15 72,682 13.7 Central government bondsd
n.a. 38,787 7.3 Othere
n.a. 529,283 100.0 Total uses
n.a. 471,993 n.a. Total excluding Postal Savings SA
Source: Ministry of Finance (2002a).
Note: Line numbers refer to ﬁgure 2.1. n.a. = not applicable.
aTFB loans to the former JNR and former JNR Settlement Corp (JNRSC), which the gov-
ernment assumed (see box 2.1). Unlike other loans to the general account, these are included
in the formal FILP Plan.
bFunds the TFB has loaned back to the postal savings system for it to invest directly. These
are excluded from the net total.
cIncludes ¥3,352 billion in contributed capital and ¥256,265 billion in loans.
dIncluding JNR loans (see note a) the central government total is ¥79,961 billion.
eIncludes short-term loans (mainly to the SA for Grants of Allocation Tax and Transfer Taxes
[to local governments]) and certain ﬁnancial investments with a maturity of less than ﬁve
years.and pension payouts of the public pension system during the current ﬁscal
year.
Uses of FILP funds are grouped into seven categories, as shown in table
2.2. Box 2.1 explains the FILP loan to the general account.
The ﬁrst ﬁve uses are formally put in the FILP Plan every year and sub-
mitted to the Diet as an attachment to the budget bill. Thus, the size of the
FILP Plan (¥418 trillion for the end of March 2001) is smaller than the to-
tal size of the FILP. This is because the total program includes the TFB’s
holding of government bonds and other ﬁnancial assets.
The FILP Plan disburses funds to many local governments, which ac-
count for 24 percent of net FILP loans, and ﬁfty-seven other entities. Of
the latter, eleven are central government accounts (Postal Savings Special
Account, nine other special accounts, and Japan National Railroads
[JNR] loans) and forty-six are FILP agencies (eight government ﬁnancial
institutions, twenty-seven SPCs, and eleven special ﬁrms).
Table 2.3 summarizes data on the ﬁfty-eight entities that had outstand-
ing FILP loans or government-guaranteed bonds (which are held by the
public but considered a part of the FILP) at the end of March 2001. The
total was ¥414 trillion, or ¥357 trillion net of ¥57 trillion loaned back to
the postal savings system.
2.1.2 Historical Development
When the FILP started in the 1950s, ﬁnancing economic recovery was
the most important goal. Hence, the FILP heavily targeted industrial ﬁ-
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Box 2.1 FILP Loan to the General Account
The ¥7.3 trillion FILP loan to the general account relate to pri-
vatization of the former JNR. The JNR started to run deﬁcits in
1964, but was allowed to continue operation and to add to its
debt. When JNR was privatized in 1987, ¥25.5 trillion of its debt
and some JNR assets were transferred to a newly created JNRSC.
The remaining debt was assumed by the central government and
creditors (including the TFB) received newly issued Japanese
government bonds. The JNRSC was supposed to pay down its
debt over ten years using proceeds from sales of the assets it
received. Assets sales stalled and the amount of liabilities actual-
ly  increased. When the statute establishing JNRSC expired in
1997, the government assumed almost all of its ¥28.3 trillion debt.
Thus, the ¥7.3 trillion loan from the FILP should be considered
a loan to these already-failed corporations.nancing through the Japan Development Bank (JDB; predecessor of the
present Development Bank of Japan) and other government ﬁnancial in-
stitutions. When the economy recovered and started to grow rapidly, the
focus gradually shifted to housing (including mortgage lending) and proj-
ects to improve living standards (such as building sewer systems). Provid-
ing assistance to small businesses also became an important goal. Financ-
ing industrial development does not constitute a large area for the FILP
Plan any more: Only 1 percent of new funds are used for this purpose. Table
2.4 provides a breakdown of the FILP Plan for ﬁscal 2001 by target areas.
2.2 Financial Condition of FILP Agencies
In this and the next ﬁve sections, we examine the ﬁnancial condition of
the FILP recipients other than the local governments, which collectively
receive 76 percent of the total net FILP loans. The ﬁnancial condition of
the local governments is examined in section 2.8.
The ﬁrst step in analyzing the ﬁnancial condition of the FILP recipients
is to look at the self-reported accounting information. By their own ac-
counts, nine recipients of FILP funds are insolvent. That is only a very par-
tial picture, however. The publicly disclosed accounting statements of
FILP recipients exhibit serious problems, which make it hard to assess
their ﬁnancial conditions.
To provide a more accurate list of insolvent agencies and estimate the
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Table 2.3 FILP Loans and Bond Guarantees, 31 March 2001 (¥ billions)
Number of Recipientsa Amount Originating Lending Source
47 270,844 Trust Fund Bureaub
32 61,658 Postal Life Insurance
33 1 Industrial Investment SA
51 332,533 Net total FILP loansb
24 24,579 Government-guaranteed bonds
57 357,112 Total
1 57,350 Postal Savings SA loans
58 414,462 Total FILP fundsc
Source: This table is the column totals of supplemental table 1, which provides data (from
Ministry of Finance 2002a) on each of the ﬁfty-eight recipients. It is available on our web site
(http://www.econ.keio.ac.jp/staﬀ/tdoi/ and http://www2-irps.ucsd.edu/faculty/thoshi/) and the
NBER web site (http://www.nber.org/data/).
aNumber of recipients, counting local governments (which have TFB and Postal Life Insur-
ance [PLI] loans) as one. Not counting local governments and the Postal Savings SA (see note
b), there are ﬁfty recipients of FILP loans and an additional six have bond guarantees but no
loans.
bExcludes funds the TFB has loaned back to the postal savings system for it to invest directly.
With them, loans from the TFB total ¥328,194 and total loans are ¥389,883.
cAdding ¥3,352 in capital contributions to this yields the ¥417,814 FILP Plan total in table
2.2.cost to taxpayers of the FILP, in each of the next four sections we look at a
problem area and make adjustments to provide a more accurate assess-
ment. The ﬁrst three areas involve ﬁnancial losses already accumulated.
The losses already made come from two principal sources: underreserving
for bad loans and overvaluing assets. In addition, other adjustments need
to be made to the stated capital (reserves) of many FILP participants. Our
analysis of these areas involves examining the balance sheets of FILP par-
ticipants.1 The fourth area is the present value of the cost of covering ex-
pected future losses that will arise if FILP agencies continue to operate. To
estimate this, we rely on projections made by the agencies themselves.
2.3 Capital (Reserves)
In assessing ﬁnancial condition, we have paid special attention to the
amount of capital (usually called reserves in public corporation account-
ing). The amount of capital measures how much loss the entity can sustain
without requiring additional resources from the government. Negative
capital means de facto insolvency. Because the government is both a large
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16.1 Small and medium businesses
11.2 Road construction





2.3 National land preservationb
2.3 Transport and communication
1.0 Industry and technology
Source: Ministry of Finance (2002a).
Note:The FILP plan total for the year was ¥32.5 trillion. For further information, see Cargill
and Yoshino (2000, table 8.3), who show the uses of FILP funds by target areas from 1955 to
1998.
aIncludes forestry and ﬁsheries.
bIncludes reconstruction in the event of disaster.
1. Five special accounts and one special ﬁrm do not publish balance sheets regularly, so
they are excluded from our analysis. Fortunately, the ¥4.5 trillion in FILP loans to them
amounts to just 1.3 percent of net FILP loans. The six are noted on supplemental table 1,
which is available on our web sites and the NBER web site (see note 2). Also available on our
web sites are the balance sheets and income statements included in the administrative cost
statements compiled by the SPCs studied here.creditor and the equity holder of public corporations, insolvency implies
future losses for the government, and hence for taxpayers. If the capital is
positive but very small, taxpayers are risk for providing more money if even
small losses occur. We will see that this is a pervasive problem.
The amount of capital falls for many corporations when they restate
their balance sheets based on accounting standards for the private sector.
By their own accounts, nine agencies are insolvent—that is, they have neg-
ative capital ratios. (As an example of how labyrinthine FILP accounting
is, a tenth agency is insolvent on its original balance sheet but manages to
become solvent using private sector standards!)
Data on capital are included in table 2.5 as column (5). Supplemental
table 22lists the amount of capital for each government account and public
corporation as reported on its original balance sheet (that is, using ac-
counting standards for public corporations) and on its administrative cost
statement (using standards for private sector ﬁrms), as well as the capital
ratio.
There is a quite serious accounting problem regarding the largest recip-
ient of FILP funds, Government Housing Loan Corporation (GHLC),
and two small special accounts. Their balance sheets list cumulative losses
on the asset side. The losses are to be paid oﬀ over time by gradually re-
ducing capital. Because the losses have been identiﬁed already and are not
likely to be eliminated (without a corresponding reduction of the capital or
infusion of new capital), it is necessary to subtract these items from capi-
tal immediately to get an unbiased picture of their current ﬁnancial condi-
tion. In our analysis, the cumulative losses are subtracted from assets in
calculating these agencies’ capital. Such losses amount to ¥518.6 billion in
total.
2.4 Nonperforming Loans
Disclosed nonperforming loans totaled ¥5.6 trillion in March 2001,
which is 3.2 percent of total loans made by the institutions. This is a lower
bound for the level of bad loans. Although reporting of nonperforming
loans may be better than before, the small loan-loss reserves of many insti-
tutions suggest serious underreserving. Table 2.6, column (1), summarizes
the amount of bad loans disclosed in the administrative cost statements.
(Supplemental table 33 has data for each agency.)
Bad loans on the administrative cost statements of government ﬁnancial
institutions are risk management loans, deﬁned in the same way as for
private sector banks. These are loans to failed enterprises, loans more than
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2. See our websites (http://www.econ.keio.ac.jp/staﬀ/tdoi/ and http://www2-irps.ucsd.edu/
faculty/thoshi/) and the NBER website (http://www.nber.org/data/).












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.three months past due, and restructured loans (i.e., loans that have relaxed
conditions). Note that loans clearly headed for trouble, but technically still
performing, do not need to be included. Nonﬁnancial SPCs must disclose
only loans that are past due more than six months; They hold 6.4 percent
of the bad loans in the table.
In determining underreserving, we assume 100 percent of reported bad
loans will be lost eventually. The 100 percent loss rate may seem extreme,
but the late 1990s experience of private sector banks shows this actually is
a rather conservative assumption. At the end of March 1996, the ﬁrst time
that all banks in the private sector disclosed risk-management loans, the
total was ¥28.5 trillion. Disposal of bad loans cost banks ¥34.7 trillion in
the following three years. Despite writing oﬀ 122 percent of the starting
level, total risk-management loans at the end of March 1999 stood at
¥29.6 trillion, slightly higher than the initial level! This suggests risk-
management loans at the end of March 1996 were severely underreported.
It seems reasonable to expect a similar magnitude of underreporting by
FILP agencies.
Of the twenty-six agencies covered, only ﬁve have reserves equal to or in
excess of their bad loans. For the twenty-one agencies that are underre-
served, estimated underreserving is ¥3.2 trillion. One agency, Japan Fi-
nance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises (JFM), does not have any
loan loss reserves on its balance sheet, but it should (box 2.2). Total un-
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Table 2.6 Disclosed Bad Loans of FILP Agencies, 31 March 2001
Bad Loan Loan Loss Reserve
As % of As % of Name or Type of Agency and
¥ Billionsa All Loansb ¥ Billions Bad Loansa Number of Agenciesd
1,398 1.8 41 2.9 Government Housing Loan Corp
3,148 5.0 1,629 51.8 Other government ﬁnancial institutions (6)
519 2.3 354 41.6 SPCs (18)
534 4.9 465 87.0 Shoko Chukin Bank
5,599 3.2 2,489 44.5 Total for all agencies
5,441 3.2 2,262 41.6 Total for underreserved agencies (21)
Source: Summarized from supplemental table 3, which provides data speciﬁc to each agency. It is avail-
able on our web sites and the NBER web site (see table 2.3).
Note: The absolute amount of underreserving for each agency is included in table 2.5. Total underre-
serving (the diﬀerence between bad loans in column [1] and reserves in column [3]) is ¥3,179 billion for
underreserved agencies. Including JFM (see box 2.2), the total is ¥8,251 billion.
aFor government ﬁnancial institutions and Shoko Chukin Bank, entries are for risk-management loans.
SPCs are allowed to use a less strict deﬁnition. For them, the ﬁgures show amounts of loans past-due six
months or more or loans to bankrupt entities that they report with their balance sheets.
bBad loans as a percentage of total loans made.
cAn entry under 100 percent means the agency is underreserved.
dOnly agencies that disclose nonperforming loans are included.derreserving including JFM reaches ¥8.3 trillion. Table 2.6 summarizes
loan loss reserves and reserves as a percentage of bad loans.
2.5 Valuation of Physical Assets
The value of physical assets reported on balance sheets of SPCs may not
reﬂect the true value of the assets, primarily because they are not properly
depreciated, and also because assets are not marked-to-market.
When book value (original cost) is used for land purchased a long time
ago, its actual value can be signiﬁcantly understated. On the other hand, if
a corporation has assets that have lost value (such as land purchased in the
late 1980s), book value may overstate the true value.
Improper depreciation of physical assets is a more serious problem and
it tends to overstate the level of existing assets. For example, Iwamoto
(1998a, 166) reports that Japan Highway Public Corporation is allowed to
(and actually does) accumulate reserves for depreciation out of proﬁts
whenever it feels it is convenient, rather than charging depreciation every
year. Hence the assets ﬁgures on its balance sheet are gross capital num-
bers, which include past depreciation. To get net numbers, one has to sub-
tract cumulative reserves (for future redemption of loans) from the capital.
Capital calculated in this way still suﬀers from the problem of underre-
porting of depreciation, because the corporation charges depreciation
only when a suﬃcient amount of proﬁt is realized.
2.5.1 Revaluing Assets
For twelve corporations that carry large amounts of physical assets on
their books, we have revalued their assets to reﬂect market value changes
and proper depreciation. All are involved in urban development or pro-
viding infrastructure.
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Box 2.2
Table 2.6 and supplemental table 3 do not list JFM, which rais-
es fund by issuing government-guaranteed bonds and lends to
local governments and public corporations owned by local gov-
ernments, because it claims to have no risk management loans.
Because we have budget data for local governments, we could
estimate JFM underreservation in the same way we estimate
expected losses on FILP funds lent to local governments. The
details are reported later, but the calculation suggests that
¥5,072.5 billion of JFM loans is likely to be uncollectible, and
thus the amount of underreservation also is ¥5,072.5 billion.Comparing the amounts reported on their original balance sheets to
those reported in their administrative cost statements, some public corpo-
rations adjusted their assets ﬁgures substantially downward. Still, our cal-
culations suggest the oﬃcial numbers remain overstated for many agen-
cies, and the level of misvaluation varies signiﬁcantly. For the eleven with
overvaluations, the total is ¥11.4 trillion.4
2.6 Future Losses
In addition to the losses already incurred, some FILP agencies are ex-
pected to generate more ﬁnancial losses if they continue to operate. Care-
fully estimating the size of such future losses is beyond the scope of this
chapter. Instead, we rely on the policy cost analysis conducted by each
FILP agency.
The analysis, which calculates a present discounted value of estimated
government subsidies needed to cover the diﬀerence between revenues
from FILP projects and their costs, started in ﬁscal 1999. That year, the
analysis was applied to ﬁve agencies. In ﬁscal 2000, coverage was extended
to fourteen agencies, and with ﬁscal 2001, all thirty-three agencies that re-
ceive new funds from the FILP were required to publish a policy cost anal-
ysis. Kikkawa, Sakai, and Miyagawa (2000) have found that the published
policy cost analyses often seriously overestimate future revenues, and
hence underestimate the policy cost. Thus, the published data should be
taken as a lower bound for expected future losses.
Projects are expected to generate more revenue than costs at ﬁve agen-
cies. For the twenty-eight agencies expecting policy costs, the total as of
March 2001 is ¥11.7 trillion; for all thirty-three agencies the projected
cost is ¥11.4 trillion. (The estimate made by each agency is in table 2.5
column [3].)
2.7 FILP Agency Losses
Table 2.8 summarizes and totals the ﬁnancial losses revealed by our
analysis in the previous sections. At March 2001, for the thirty-four FILP
agencies for which we estimate losses the total was ¥31.0 trillion. These
losses reduce the agencies’ net capital, in some cases giving them negative
net capital.
Our analysis ﬁnds twenty FILP agencies that are insolvent (have nega-
tive net capital) including projected policy costs. Of these, nine are admit-
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4. The Supplemental Appendix A describes the revaluation method in detail and discusses
the depreciation rates and land price series used for each corporation. Data are in supple-
mental table 4. These are available on our web sites and the NBER web site. Two other agen-
cies report signiﬁcant physical assets, but we are unable to revalue their assets because
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.tedly insolvent (have negative capital on their administrative statements),
and another eleven are shown to be insolvent after adjustments for the ac-
counting problems we have outlined. Data are in table 2.5.
The twenty insolvent agencies represent more than 60 percent (¥217 tril-
lion) of net FILP fund loans. Not all of the bad loans have been, or will be,
truly lost to the FILP. Indeed, because the borrowers are all government or
quasi-governmental institutions, we expect all FILP loans to be paid in full
eventually. Taxpayer money will be used if necessary, as has already hap-
pened for the former JNR. That means the funds the agencies receive to
pay back FILP loans should be considered a cost of the FILP, one that will
be borne by future taxpayers.
Thus, a comprehensive approach to the FILP’s cost to the public is to
estimate what it would take to bail-out all FILP agencies. This involves
computing the amount of capital originally contributed by the government
that has already been lost and the cumulative losses that exceed the gov-
ernment’s original capital. Data for forty-four agencies are in table 2.7.
The government has lost all or part of its capital in forty agencies, a to-
tal of almost ¥12.4 trillion. Losses that exceed original capital add another
¥23.4 trillion, for a total loss of ¥35.8 trillion.
2.8 Local Governments
Of ¥357 trillion of net FILP funds outstanding at the end of March 2001,
¥87 trillion (24.4 percent) were loans directly to local governments and
public enterprises owned by local governments. These entities also borrow
from the JFM, which is a large recipient of FILP funds. Thus, the solvency
of local governments is an important determinant of the ﬁnancial health of
the FILP.
The amount of FILP loans to local governments each year is determined
in a process that is led by the Ministry of Public Management, Home
Aﬀairs, Posts and Telecommunications (Ministry of Home Aﬀairs before
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Table 2.8 Total Financial Losses of FILP Agencies with Losses, 31 March 2001
(¥ billions)
Number of Agencies 
with Each type of Loss Amount of Loss Source of Loss
22 8,251 Underreserving of bad loans
11 11,357 Overvaluing of assets
28 11,657 Policy costs
3 –228 Policy gains oﬀsetting other losses
34 31,037 Total
Source: Table 2.5, which gives data by agency.
Note: The total amount (¥31.0 trillion) is about 6 percent of GDP.the government restructuring in January 2001). The process requires any
local government planning a bond issue to obtain the Ministry’s permis-
sion in advance. When permission is granted, the Ministry also decides
how much of the bonds will be bought by the TFB Fund and Postal Life
Insurance Fund.
There is no mechanism ensuring FILP loans go only to ﬁnancially
healthy entities. Indeed, loans are routinely used by the Ministry to distrib-
ute funds to ﬁnancially troubled local governments and may even be skewed
toward such governments. Doi (2002) found that a local government that
depends heavily on FILP loans tends to have low tax revenues and a large
amount of local-allocation tax grants (lump-sum grants distributed by the
central government to make up for shortages in local tax revenues.)
Thus, one would suspect that many local governments with high debts
are servicing the debts using funds provided by the central government. If
this is the case, we would ﬁnd a substantial amount of nonperforming
FILP loans to local governments.
Local governments are not required to prepare balance sheets, which
prevents us from applying the approach used for FILP agencies. So, in this
section, we focus on the ability for a local government to pay oﬀ its current
outstanding bonds.
2.8.1 Local Government Solvency and Losses
For each local government, we calculate debt capacity deﬁned as the
present discounted value of future expected primary surpluses (revenues
minus noninterest expenditures). If the current local government debt ex-
ceeds the calculated debt capacity, we conclude the local government is de
facto insolvent.
Budget data for ﬁscal 1997 through 2000 are used. A lack of budget data
prevents including public enterprises owned by local governments. Thus,
the estimates reported are a lower bound for the losses expected in FILP
loans to local governments and local public enterprises. We start by esti-
mating future primary surpluses for each local government, using six
diﬀerent scenarios.
Estimating Procedure
Letting Si denote the expected primary surplus for the local government
i, we can calculate the debt capacity of the government, denoted by Bi∗,
as
(1) Bi∗   max  
S
r
i  , 0 ,
where r is the constant discount rate, assumed to be 4 percent. Note that
we assume debt capacity cannot be below zero. Thus, if a local government
runs a primary deﬁcit, its debt capacity is deﬁned as zero.
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denoted by Bi,2001, we can calculate the amount of debt that is not likely to
be paid oﬀ. Let us deﬁne DF i,2000 as
(2) DF i,2001   max{Bi,2000 – Bi∗, 0}.
If DF i,2000 is strictly positive, we say the local government is de facto insol-
vent and the size of DF i,2000 shows the magnitude of insolvency. The result,
of course, depends critically on the estimated level of Si.
The Scenarios
In the baseline case (scenario 1), we assume this is constant and equal to
the simple average of the primary surpluses in ﬁscal 1997–2000.
Because we estimate the future primary surplus from data for four years
when the economy was stagnating (April 1997 through March 2001), it
might be lower than the long-run level after the economy recovers. To ad-
dress this, we consider scenario 2, which assumes general revenue (tax rev-
enue, local transfer taxes, and local-allocation tax) jumps 20 percent in the
ﬁrst year and stays there.
Another assumption in the baseline case is that the future primary sur-
plus does not grow. Scenario 3 considers an alternative where the surplus
grows 2 percent each year.
In the ﬁrst three scenarios, we assume the local governments can con-
tinue to rely on local-allocation tax grants from the central government.
That system, however, is likely to change in the near future. Its overhaul is
an important part of the ﬁscal decentralization that the government has
been deliberating since the mid 1990s.
A Decentralization Promotion Committee was created within the Prime
Minister’s Oﬃce in 1995, and started drafting a decentralization plan. The
committee published its ﬁnal report in June 2001. On the issue of local-
allocation tax grants, the committee argues that there should be a transfer
of tax bases from the central government to local governments to improve
the ﬁscal condition of local governments and that the local-allocation tax
grants should be reduced so that the transfer of tax bases is neutral to the
total tax revenue of the central and local governments (see Decentraliza-
tion Promotion Committee 2001, chap. 3, section 1).
In scenarios 4, 5, and 6, we consider the case where the tax base for lo-
cal-allocation tax grants is assumed to be transferred to local governments
according to the current size of their own tax revenues, and local-
allocation tax grants become zero. Scenario 4 assumes the expected future
primary surplus is given by the average for ﬁscal 1997–2000. Scenario 5 as-
sumes general tax revenue increases 20 percent in the ﬁrst year and then
stays constant. Scenario 6 assumes the future primary surplus grows 2 per-
cent annually.
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Table 2.9 summarizes the results of our calculation. At the end of ﬁscal
2000, total debts outstanding for forty-seven prefectures, 693 cities (and
wards in Tokyo), and 2,557 towns and villages amounted to ¥125.5 trillion,
of which ¥55.0 trillion was owed to the FILP fund and ¥8.2 trillion was
owed to the JFM. These are amounts in the ordinary accounts of local gov-
ernments, and do not include debts in enterprise accounts and of public
corporations owned by the local governments.
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Table 2.9 Expected Insolvency of Local Governments, 31 March 2001 (¥ billions)
Source of Funds Borrower, By Type
Cities Towns
JFMa FILP Totalb Prefectures & Wards & Villages
n.a. n.a. n.a. 47 693 2,557 Number
8,246.4 54,999.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Total loaned
n.a. n.a. 124,760.7 72,326.3 41,831.4 10,603.0 Total debtb
Loans to Insolvent Entitiesc
Scenario
6,160.4 42,331.1d 105,775.5 69,546.4 29,767.3 6,461.8 1
1,443.6 10,964.1 30,150.5 25,622.9 3,665.3 862.2 2
5,207.6 36,199.1 94,659.8 66,656.9 23,244.4 4,758.5 3
5,803.0 39,553.1 85,463.4 52,475.8 22,737.7 10,249.9 4
4,389.8 31,785.9 64,891.2 46,115.2 9,135.7 9,640.2 5
5,718.6 39,171.5 84,762.0 52,475.8 22,158.7 10,127.4 6
Expected Defaulte
5,072.5 35,201.8f 89,517.4 61,862.5 22,633.4 5,021.5 1
462.7 3,494.4 9,374.4 5,943.1 2,929.2 502.1 2
4,397.3 30,317.1 76,342.5 53,983.2 18,316.4 4,042.8 3
5,679.1 38,925.9 84,282.2 52,475.8 21,558.1 10,248.2 4
4,263.1 31,178.8 63,617.2 46,089.4 7,931.4 9,596.3 5
5,582.8 38,384.2 83,118.6 52,475.8 20,472.1 10,170.7 6
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: The scenarios are explained in the text. The analysis excludes local public enterprises because of a
lack of data. These enterprises have losses, so the estimates here are lower bounds. n.a. = not applicable.
aJFM is the Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises.
bTotal debt outstanding, deﬁned as local bonds plus contract-authorized liabilities minus reserve minus
net excess of revenue at the end of ﬁscal year 2000.
cSum of the debts of insolvent local governments, where insolvency is deﬁned as debts exceeding debt ca-
pacity. Debt capacity is the present discounted value of the expected level of primary surplus, as ex-
plained in the text. A 4 percent discount rate is assumed.
dValue for “Loans to Insolvent local goverments” used in table 2.10.
eSum of the diﬀerences between total debts and debt capacities under each scenario. The seniority of
FILP and JFM loans are assumed to be the same as other liabilities.
fValue for “Expected Default of local government debt” used in table 2.11.If the current system of local-allocation tax grants continues and if the
primary surpluses of local governments do not improve (scenario 1, the
baseline case), the current level of local debts is estimated to exceed the debt
capacity for all forty-seven prefectures, 326 out of 693 cities, and 1,240 of
2,557 towns and villages. The total size of the insolvency is ¥89.5 trillion. In
other words, these entities have borrowed almost ¥90 trillion more than we
expect them to be able to repay based on their current tax and spending pat-
terns. Assuming that the insolvency is addressed by defaulting on the loans
(rather than raising taxes or cutting spending) and that FILP loans and JFM
loans have the same seniority as other debts, 64 percent (¥35.2 trillion) of the
outstanding FILP loans to local governments and 62 percent (¥5.1 trillion)
of the outstanding JFM loans to local governments will be defaulted.
When we assume the system of local-allocation tax grants is decentral-
ized (scenario 4), debt capacity improves for some prefectures and cities,
while the capacity of many towns and villages declines. This is because the
current allocation of tax grants is skewed in favor of ﬁnancially poor local
governments, which include many towns and villages.
Scenarios 2 and 5, which assume an economic recovery that increases
general revenue 20 percent, of course produce much smaller losses. Com-
paring scenarios 2 and 5 suggests that the increased debt capacity of local
governments in scenario 2 mostly results from increased local-allocation
tax grants at local governments already receiving disproportionately large
allocations. When the system of grants is decentralized (scenario 5), these
governments lose the extra-large allocations. The result suggests that many
such local governments would not be able to meet the debt payments with-
out redistribution through grants at the current level.
Scenarios 3 and 6, which have 2 percent annual growth in the primary
surplus, see enhanced debt capacities of some local governments, but the
expected amount of insolvency are not much diﬀerent from the baselines
(scenarios 1 and 4).
2.9 Overall Cost to Taxpayers
Table 2.10 summarizes total bad loans. Of the ¥357 trillion of net FILP
funds, 75 percent (¥267 trillion) can be considered bad loans.
Our estimate of the total cost to taxpayers to bail-out and recapitalize
public corporations, cover local-government defaults, and retire former
JNR–related debt is ¥78.3 trillion, which amounts to over 15 percent of ﬁs-
cal 2000 GDP (table 2.11). As discussed previously, we consider this a
lower bound.
2.10 Fundamental Reform
A government study in the late 1990s found three shortcomings in the
FILP that have motivated change (Ministry of Finance 2001, 24). First, the
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serves, may have become too big to be eﬃcient. Second, too much consid-
eration for TFB depositors (that is, the pension funds and postal savings)
may have been keeping the cost of FILP funds too high. Third, the opaque
nature of the FILP’s subsidy component may have been hiding substantial
future burdens on taxpayers.
To address these issues, eﬀective 1 April 2001, the FILP went through a
fundamental reform. Figure 2.2 shows how the FILP system will look
when the transition is complete.
The TFB has been abolished. Its personnel and assets have been inher-
ited by the Fiscal Loan Fund (FLF). Postal savings and pension reserves
are not automatically deposited into the FLF. Instead, the funds are in-
vested in the ﬁnancial market at the discretion of the postal savings and
pension systems, as was the case already for a small share of the funds.
The way FILP agencies raise their funds also has changed. Under the
new FILP, the agencies raise funds in three ways. The preferred way is for
an agency to issue its own bonds in the ﬁnancial market. The Framework
of the Fundamental Reform declares that each agency should “make ut-
most eﬀort to issue FILP agency bonds” (Ministry of Finance 2001, 28).
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Table 2.10 Bad Loans in the FILP, 31 March 2001 (¥ trillions)
Amount Borrower
7.3 JNR-related debt (box 2.1)
217.0 Insolvent agenciesa
42.3 Insolvent local governments (table 2.9)
266.6 Total
aInsolvent agencies (that is, agencies with negative net capital) are listed in table 2.5. Their
debt is included with their entries in supplement table 1, which is available on our web sites
and the NBER web site (see table 2.3).
Table 2.11 Expected Cost to Taxpayers, 31 March 2001 (¥ trillions)
Amount Source
7.3 JNR-related debt (box 2.1)
35.8 Cost to restore capital of FILP agencies (table 2.7), composed of
12.4 Lost original capital
23.5 Cumulative operating losses in excess of original capital
35.2 Expected default of local government debt (table 2.9)
78.3 Total
Note:The cost to restore capital of FILP agencies (¥35.8 trillion) in this table diﬀers from the
total ﬁnancial losses reported in table 5.8 (¥31.0 trillion) because the ﬁgure in this table in-
cludes the losses that are already reported on the agencies’ original balance sheets even before
we estimate the additional losses in table 2.8.Agencies not healthy enough to place bonds in the open market will be al-
lowed to issue bonds with a government guarantee. Finally, agencies can
tap funds raised collectively through the issuance of FILP bonds by the
FLF.
2.10.1 Intended Results of the Reform
Use of FILP agency bonds rather than TFB funds can potentially elim-
inate the problem of fund costs, if some FILP agencies can issue bonds at
lower yields than they have been paying the TFB for funds.
Nontransparency is addressed by requiring further disclosure of FILP
agencies and the FILP system as a whole. Two speciﬁc measures have been
implemented.
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Fig. 2.2 Structure of the new FILP after April 2001
Note:A box represents a sector or an institution involved in the FILP. The arrows indicate the
direction of the movement of funds, with solid lines indicating ﬁnancial transactions and bro-
ken lines being ﬁscal transfers. The postal savings and the postal life insurance fund plan to
buy bonds directly from local governments, because most of the local governments would
have trouble ﬂoating their bonds in the market. The purchases of local bonds are not included
in this ﬁgure.First, starting with ﬁscal 1999, the government began calculating the
policy cost for each FILP agency and publishing the result. Policy cost is
deﬁned as the present discounted value of the stream of net transfers from
the government to an agency. This measure reveals the expected cost to the
government (thus, taxpayers) to sustaining operation of an agency.
Second, in June 2001, the Fiscal System Council of the Ministry of Fi-
nance came up with a recommendation on accounting disclosures for
SPCs. As a result, all SPCs (many of which are FILP agencies) were re-
quired to publish “administrative cost statements” for ﬁscal 2000 by the
end of September 2001. These are discussed in the next section.
2.10.2 Administrative Cost Statements
SPCs are required to publish balance sheets and income statements us-
ing the accounting standards of private sector ﬁrms beginning with the ﬁs-
cal 2000 (which ended March 2001). The opportunity cost of government
funds used as capital for the agency also is calculated. Adding that to the
loss shown on the income statement yields the “administrative cost state-
ment” (gyosei cost keisansho). (The importance of including the opportu-
nity cost of government funds was ﬁrst pointed out by Fukao 1998.)
The statements are supposed to be free from the accounting problems
identiﬁed in earlier sections. For example, the Fiscal System Council’s
guideline requires SPCs to adjust depreciable assets for depreciation. They
also require government ﬁnancial institutions (but not SPCs) to disclose
nonperforming loans using the same criteria as private sector ﬁnancial in-
stitutions.
Although the reform was launched on 1 April 2001, implementation is
planned to be gradual and many transitional measures are provided. For
example, postal savings and the pension reserves are committed to buy a
substantial amount of FILP bonds until the market for the bonds fully de-
velops. Moreover, the postal savings and the postal life insurance fund plan
to buy bonds directly from local governments, because most local govern-
ments would have trouble ﬂoating bonds in the market. Thus, the discre-
tion that the postal savings and other funds are supposed to enjoy is seri-
ously limited during the transition period.
2.10.3 Actual Substantive Change is Not Assured
A comparison of the old and new systems reveals the possibility that, the
government’s claim that the reform is fundamental notwithstanding, the
new system may in practice not diﬀer substantially from the old after all. It
is possible for the new system to replicate the ﬁnancial ﬂows of the old sys-
tem even after the transitional measures expire. For example, postal sav-
ings may continue to buy FILP bonds, and FILP agencies may continue to
borrow from the FLF. Then, although the name of the intermediary is
diﬀerent, the ﬂow of funds would be exactly the same as under the old sys-
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ﬁnancial market and can continue to depend on the FLF.5
The introduction of FILP agency bonds, which are supposed to be with-
out government guarantees, may not change the situation much, either.
The market may continue to believe FILP agency bonds are implicitly
guaranteed by the government. Wallison (2001) makes an interesting com-
parison between FILP agency bonds and bonds issued by government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs), such as Federal National Mortgage Associ-
ation (FNMA, or Fannie Mae) in the United States. He points out that
even though U.S. legislation explicitly states that Fannie Mae securities are
not government guaranteed, yields on its securities are only slightly higher
than on U.S. Treasury bonds. Thus, he is skeptical of the idea of market dis-
cipline from FILP agency bonds.
2.11 Eﬀects of Reform
Reform does not change losses that the FILP has already sustained, but
it may prevent FILP agencies from accumulating further losses. After the
reform, public corporations are supposed to raise funds from the ﬁnancial
market. The postal savings and pension reserve funds, which used to fund
them automatically through the TFB now can invest in the ﬁnancial mar-
ket, without necessarily buying the FILP bonds or FILP agency bonds.
The changes are intended to expose public corporations to market mon-
itoring. A loss-accumulating corporation may have diﬃculty raising funds
and may be forced to restructure its operation. Or, the central government
may be forced to subsidize a corporation explicitly so that it can continue
its loss-making but socially beneﬁcial activities.
Writing fourteen months from the start of the reform, we can examine
some early data to see whether the reform looks promising. First, we look
at how uses of postal savings funds and the sources of funds used by FILP
agencies have changed. Second, we study the secondary market pricing of
the limited number of FILP agency bonds being traded.
2.11.1 Flow of Funds
Financial ﬂows in the FILP need to change substantially to make FILP
agencies subject to the market discipline. However, the reform may not
necessarily change the ﬂow of funds: If the postal savings system chooses
to buy FILP agency bonds, FILP bonds, and local government bonds,
ﬂows in the reformed FILP will replicate those of the old FILP.
Table 2.12 shows planned uses of postal savings funds for the ﬁrst two
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5. Several local governments—including Tokyo Metropolitan and Osaka City—were issu-
ing bonds in the ﬁnancial market before the reform. However, the amount of outstanding lo-
cal bonds so issued is a little less than 10 percent of total local bonds outstanding. In the ﬁrst
year since the reform, the issuance amount has hardly changed.years after the FILP reform (ﬁscal 2001 and 2002). There are no substan-
tial changes: The majority of available funds are to be invested in the FILP
and most of the rest is to be invested much as it was by the TFB. The opti-
mistic interpretation is that the allocation of postal savings so far has been
heavily constrained by transitional measures that require postal savings to
absorb a substantial amount of FILP bonds.
The sources of funds for FILP agencies also show little change. Table
2.13 gives the amount of the FILP loans to public corporations in the FILP
plans for ﬁscal 2001 and 2002 and compares those to the size of FILP
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Table 2.12 Sources and Uses of New Postal Savings Funds (¥ billions)
FY 2001a FY 2002b
Sources of Funds
32,297 23,723 Matured TFB deposits
8,223 15,393 Otherc
–16,019 –3,848 Reduction in depositsd
24,501 35,267 Total
Uses of Funds
15,800 13,600 FILP bonds
1,200 7,950 Other JGBe
450 450 Public corporation bonds
550 550 Local government bonds
1,000 980 Local government loans
934 713 Loans to depositors
400 400 Corporate bonds
50 50 Foreign bonds
750 2,350 Money trustf
3,367 8,224 Short-term securities
Sources:Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (2000) and Postal Services Agency (2001).
aFiscal year ending 31 March 2002.
bFiscal year ending 31 March 2003.
cIncome from the investments made by postal savings on its own account.
dExpected net withdrawals by depositors in the postal savings system.
eJapanese government bonds.
fThis relates to the Postal Life Insurance Welfare Corp.
Table 2.13 Use of FILP Agency Bonds (¥ billions)
FY 2001 FY 2002
22,759 1,749 New FILP loansa
1,006 2,487 New issues of FILP agency bonds
4.4 14.3 Agency bonds as % of loans
Source: Ministry of Finance (2002a).
aDoes not include loans to the central government or to local governments. FY = ﬁscal year.62 Takero Doi and Takeo Hoshi
agency bond issues. The introduction of FILP agency bonds is perhaps the
most important aspect of the reform, but they have not become a major
source of funds. Although for ﬁscal 2002 the ratio of bonds to loans is
planned to slightly exceed 14 percent, it will take a long time for the total
outstanding amount of bonds to approach the level of loans.
2.12 The Market’s View of Agency Bonds
A key question is whether the market sees these bonds as having implicit
government guarantees. If it does, market discipline will be absent, as there
is no incentive to monitor and evaluate the agencies. To ﬁnd the market’s
view, this section looks at ratings and spreads between agency bonds and
JGBs.
2.12.1 Ratings
Table 2.14 shows the bond ratings for FILP agencies granted by major
rating agencies. Tokyo-based R&I (Rating & Investment Information Inc.)
has the most extensive coverage of the three major rating agencies, assess-
ing bonds issued by ﬁfteen FILP agencies. The Japanese branches of
Moody’s and Standard & Poors rate far fewer, and add only two. Thus, sev-
enteen FILP agencies are rated by at least one rating agency.
The R&I seems to distinguish among FILP agencies, and this suggests it
Table 2.14 Ratings of FILP Agency Bonds (May 2002)
S&P Moody R&I Agency
AA– Aa1 AAA Japanese government bonds (JGB)
AA– Aa1 AAA Japan Finance Corp. for Municipal Enterprises
AA– Aa1 AAA Development Bank of Japan
AA– Aa1 AAA Japan Bank for International Cooperation
A+ Aa1 n.a. Japan Highway Public Corp.
n.a. Aa3 n.a. Hanshin Expressway Public Corp.
n.a. n.a. AA+ Japan Finance Corp. for Small Business
n.a. n.a. AA+ National Life Finance Corp.
n.a. n.a. AA Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries Finance Corp.
n.a. n.a. AA Japan Railway Construction Public Corp.
n.a. n.a. AA Metropolitan Expressway Public Corp.
n.a. n.a. AA Promotion & Mutual Aid Corp. for Private Schools
n.a. n.a. AA Social Welfare & Medical Service Corp.
n.a. n.a. AA Water Resources Development Public Corp.
n.a. n.a. AA– Corp. for Advanced Transport & Technology
n.a. n.a. AA– Japan Scholarship Foundation
n.a. n.a. AA– New Tokyo International Airport Authority
n.a. n.a. A+ Urban Development Corp.
Sources: Moody’s Japan (http://www.moodys.co.jp), Standard & Poor’s (http://www.
standardpoors.com/japan). Rating & Investment Information (R&I; http://www.r-i.co.jp).does not see all the bonds as government guaranteed. Three government ﬁ-
nancial institutions are rated as high as Japanese government bonds
(JGBs) were in May 2002. Most of the fourteen others were one notch be-
low. Moody’s and S&P rank the same three agencies on par with JGBs, as
does R&I. The numbers of FILP agencies that Moody’s and S&P rate are
so small that it is hard to judge if they are carefully distinguishing between
FILP agency bonds issued by diﬀerent agencies.
2.12.2 Spreads
By comparing yields on FILP agency bonds to those on JGBs or gov-
ernment-guaranteed bonds (also issued by public corporations), we can
see if the market views FILP agency bonds as implicitly guaranteed. As of
May 2002, twenty-eight bonds issued by seventeen FILP agencies have
suﬃcient secondary-market data.
Figure 2.3 plots the yields of FILP agency bonds and JGBs against ma-
turities. Agency bonds are all above the yield curve of JGBs, with the pre-
mium exceeding 80 basis points for some issues. Thus, the market seems to
view FILP agency bonds as signiﬁcantly more risky than JGBs.
Figure 2.4 compares FILP agency bonds to government-guaranteed
bonds (many issued by the agencies). The market clearly distinguishes
FILP agency bonds from government-guaranteed bonds issued by the
same agencies.
Looking at the yield spreads between the twenty-eight bonds and com-
parable JGBs shows substantial diﬀerences from one agency to another.
The spreads for bonds issued by Japan Bank for International Coopera-
tion (JBIC) and Development Bank of Japan, which are healthier than
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Fig. 2.3 Yields on FILP agency bonds and JGBs (%; 30 May 2002)the other agencies in our analysis and are rated the same as JGBs by all
three rating agencies, have been relatively small (11 to 14 basis points).
Agencies with high estimated ﬁnancial losses, tend to have high spreads
(68 to 82 basis points). At 30 May 2002, Urban Development Corpora-
tion, lowest-rated of the agencies reviewed by R&I and de facto insolvent
based on our accounting, had a spread of 77.7 basis points. The widest
spread was 81.8 basis points for an unrated issue of Japan Regional De-
velopment Corporation, although it is solvent even after accounting ad-
justments.6
The gap between low-spread agencies and high-spread agencies seems to
have widened after April 2002. This may suggest that the ﬁnancial market
for FILP agency bond is getting better at discriminating between bonds is-
sued by diﬀerent agencies.
Although the FILP reform talked about using FILP agency bonds as a
device to apply market discipline on public corporations, it is not clear how
that will work in the extreme. There is no transparent mechanism to deal
with failures of public corporations and defaults of FILP agency bonds.
Indeed, there is no legal procedure for closing a poorly performing public
corporation.
Thus, although our review suggests an emergence of market signals on
the quality of speciﬁc FILP agency bonds, it is not clear how useful this will
be in improving the allocation of funds.
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6. Supplemental table 5 provides data on the spreads of each issue. It is available on our web
sites and the NBER web site. The Japan Securities Dealers Association our original source,
posts secondary market quotes (in Japanese) on its web site: http://www.jsda.or.jp.
Fig. 2.4 Yields of FILP agency bonds and government-guaranteed public corpora-
tion bonds (%; 30 May 2002)2.13 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the ﬁnancial cost that FILP has imposed on
taxpayers by studying the ﬁnancial condition of recipients of FILP loans:
mainly public corporations and local governments. Many FILP recipients
are de facto insolvent. Of the ¥357 trillion of the net FILP funds, about
¥267 trillion is loaned to insolvent recipients. The cost to taxpayers to clean
up the expected FILP loss is estimated to be at least ¥78 trillion, over 15
percent of 2001 GDP.
Together with the massive cost of cleaning up the ﬁnancial sector (chap.
1 in this volume) and the increasing burden of the social security system
(chap. 3 in this volume), the losses in the FILP constitute a serious imped-
iment to recovery of the Japanese economy. To the extent that funds have
been misallocated to projects with low returns or that losses have resulted
from ineﬃcient use of funds, this chapter provides evidence that the FILP
has hurt economic growth, at least since the late 1990s.
Regarding the FILP reforms introduced in April 2001, we found the pat-
tern of ﬁnancial ﬂows in the FILP has hardly changed. Some good news is
that the ﬁnancial market distinguishes FILP agency bonds from govern-
ment-guaranteed bonds, which is essential if the use of FILP agency bonds
is to introduce market discipline on their issuers. It is too early to tell, how-
ever, whether the bonds will be an eﬀective disciplinary device.
2.13.1 Other Issues
There are four major issues about the FILP and its future that this chap-
ter did not examine thoroughly. These are left for future research.
First, nothing is said about the welfare aspects of the FILP. If foregone
opportunities from resource misallocation are taken into account, the wel-
fare cost of the FILP might turn out to be even larger than our estimate of
ﬁnancial losses suggests. On the other hand, some loss-making agencies
may be providing welfare-enhancing services that oﬀset the ﬁnancial
losses. Examining welfare aspects of the FILP is an important future re-
search topic.
Second, we relied on estimates of policy cost published by each FILP
agency. As Kikkawa, Sakai, and Miyagawa (2000) show, for several FILP
agencies, this most likely understates the true magnitude of the cost. Stud-
ies to improve the estimates of future losses are needed.
Third, empirical analysis of the new FILP is limited by the amount of
data, because the new regime started just fourteen months ago. It is im-
portant to continue monitoring changes in the pattern of ﬁnancial ﬂows
and development of the market for FILP agency bonds.
Finally, the lack of a clear mechanism to close down poorly performing
public corporations is an important shortcoming of the 2001 FILP reform.
Such a mechanism is a necessary condition for disciplining through FILP
Paying for the FILP 65agency bonds. Absent a strong government commitment not to bail out
public corporations, and a credible mechanism to prevent bail-outs, mar-
ket discipline will not develop (see Iwamoto 1998b).
Such a mechanism is also necessary to deal with the losses that have al-
ready been incurred by the FILP. It is important to recognize the losses as
soon as possible and to decide on the loss-sharing mechanism. Without a
clear loss-sharing mechanism, negotiations between stakeholders will lead
to delay. Delay increases the losses. Serious research on eﬃcient closure
rules for nonperforming FILP agencies is an urgent task.
Appendix
Literature Review
Good descriptions of the FILP and the postal savings system in English are
Cargill and Yoshino (2000, 2003). Bayoumi (1998) is a nice introduction to
the FILP and the Japanese ﬁscal system in general.
The FILP Report, an annual publication available on the Ministry of Fi-
nance’s web site (http://www.mof.go.jp/english), is an oﬃcial guide to the
FILP. The description is often self-congratulatory, but it provides basic in-
formation.
Kikkawa, Sakai, and Miyagawa (2000) examine the ﬁnancial health of
selected FILP agencies. Their study focuses on the future expected cash
ﬂows of the agencies. They estimate the present value of the future losses
(negative cash ﬂows) of FILP agencies to be much higher than the esti-
mates published by the Ministry of Finance. In this chapter, we do not es-
timate future cash ﬂows for each agency. Instead, we use the Ministry of Fi-
nance estimates. The results in Kikkawa suggest that our estimates of total
losses are most likely the lower bound of the true amount.
Wallison (2001) discusses the FILP reform of 2001 and argues that the
attempt to rely on the market to discipline FILP agencies without priva-
tizing them is likely to fail. Iwamoto (2002) argues that the reform has
failed to force the government to reevaluate the role of SPCs and to close
down the ones that have ceased to be useful.
In Japanese, a comprehensive survey of the huge body of research is pro-
vided by Iwamoto (2001). Most of it examines government ﬁnancial insti-
tutions in the FILP, such as the JDB and the GHLC.
Matsuura (1990), Kono (1993), and Fukao (1998) are among several pa-
pers that seek to provide a comprehensive picture on how the FILP works.
They carefully disentangle the complex ﬂow of funds and subsidies among
the central government, public corporations, and local governments in the
FILP.
66 Takero Doi and Takeo HoshiThe work most closely related to this essay are Iwata (1998) and Doi and
Mori (2003). Iwata ﬁnds serious undercapitalization, a substantial amount
of bad loans, and signiﬁcant underreporting of depreciation for selected
FILP agencies. Doi and Mori ﬁnd similar problems for a wider set of FILP
agencies. This essay complements their analyses by using more recent data.
Most importantly, we use the ﬁnancial statements of public corporations
based on private-sector accounting standards, which were ﬁrst published
2001. The problems Iwata and Doi and Mori identiﬁed are still found even
with supposedly better accounting.
Yoshida and Konishi (1996) was the ﬁrst comprehensive analysis of the
ﬁnancial condition of the FILP agencies. Perhaps hindered by incomplete
disclosure and improper accounting, they failed to recognize the serious ﬁ-
nancial problem hidden in the FILP. It is also possible that the magnitude
of the problem was smaller then. In any case, using more recent data, we
ﬁnd much a larger problem than they did.
Higo (2001) provides a very useful description of the FILP reform of
April 2001.
Noguchi and Sasaki (1999) examined yield spreads between govern-
ment-guaranteed bonds and a few non–government-guaranteed bonds
issued by FILP agencies before the 2001 FILP reform. They found the
spreads were at most 15 basis points, suggesting the ﬁnancial markets con-
sidered the bonds implicitly government-guaranteed. We ﬁnd more sub-
stantial spreads between FILP agency bonds and government-guaranteed
bonds since the FILP reform.
We go beyond a descriptive analysis of the reform and try to examine its
impact empirically. This chapter also examines the ﬁnancial health of local
governments, something the works cited generally give little, if any, atten-
tion.
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